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Abstract 
 
 
We survey both academic and proprietary models to examine how macroeconomic and 
systematic risk effects are incorporated into measures of credit risk exposure.  Many 
models consider the correlation between the probability of default (PD) and cyclical 
factors.  Few models adjust loss rates (loss given default) to reflect cyclical effects.  We 
find that the possibility of systematic correlation between PD and LGD is also neglected 
in currently available models. 
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A Survey of Cyclical Effects in 
Credit Risk Measurement Models 
 
 It has long been recognized that banking is a procyclical business.  That is, banks 
tend to contract their lending activity when business turns down because of their concern 
about loan quality and repayment probability.  This exacerbates the economic downturn 
as credit constrained businesses and individuals cut back on their real investment activity.  
In contrast, banks expand their lending activity during boom periods, thereby 
contributing to a possible overheating of the economy that may transform an economic 
expansion into an inflationary spiral.   
The proliferation of credit risk measurement models in banking may accentuate 
the procyclical tendencies of banking, with potential macroeconomic consequences.  That 
is, the models’ overly optimistic estimates of default risk during boom times reinforces 
the natural tendency of banks to overlend just at the point in the business cycle that the 
central bank prefers restraint.   Moreover, if credit risk models are unduly pessimistic 
during recessions, then even the most expansionary monetary policy may not encourage 
banks to lend to obligors that are perceived to be poor credit risks.  Recent BIS proposals 
to utilize credit risk models such as CreditMetrics as a basis for bank capital requirements 
may further accentuate the procyclical nature of banking unless the credit cycle and its 
effect on credit risk are appropriately recognized in the model structure.  If banks are 
constrained by risk sensitive (as measured by internal models) capital allocations and 
regulatory requirements, they may be unable to lend during low points in the business 
cycle and overly encouraged to lend during boom periods.1  This is because risk sensitive 
                                                 
1 To the extent that external credit ratings provide “through the cycle” estimates of default risk smoothed 
across the entire business cycle, it is the internal ratings-based approaches of the New Basel Capital Accord 
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capital requirements (e.g., RAROC-based) increase (decrease) when estimates of default 
risk increase (decrease).  Thus, if credit risk models overstate (understate) default risk in 
bad (good) times, then internal bank capital requirements will be too high (low) in bad 
(good) times, thereby forcing capital-constrained banks to retrench on lending during 
recessions and expand lending during booms.2   As stated by Andrew Crockett, the 
General Manager of the BIS, in a lecture on February 13, 2001: “[U]nderlying risk 
builds up as expansion and leverage continues, while apparent risk declines, with the 
rise in collateral values….[R]isk increases during upswings, as financial imbalances 
build up, and materialize in recessions.” Concern about the macroeconomic implications 
of the procyclical nature of risk sensitive bank capital regulations has contributed to a 
delay until 2006 in adoption of the BIS proposals for the new Basel Capital Accord.3 
In this paper, we examine the treatment of cyclical factors in both academic and 
proprietary credit risk measurement models.4  In section 2, we begin by discussing what 
is meant by procyclicality.  We then divide our survey of credit risk measurement models 
into four sections.  Section 3 surveys how various credit risk measurement models 
incorporate cyclical effects into the estimation of default probability (PD).  In Section 4, 
                                                                                                                                                 
that is most likely to exacerbate the procylical tendencies of banking.  However, if credit ratings behave 
procyclically [as shown by Ferri, Liu and Majnoni (2000), Monfort and Mulder (2000) and Reisen (2000)], 
then even the proposed standardized approach in the BIS New Capital Accord will exhibit cyclical 
fluctuations in capital requirements. 
2 Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) demonstrate that assessed risk falls during economic booms and rises 
during economic busts, although bank capital cushions lag the business cycle. 
3 For discussions of the procylical effects of regulatory and monetary policy across different countries, see 
BIS (2001). 
4 We focus on firm sensitivity to systematic risk factors as an explanation for the correlations that may 
result in procyclical lending behavior.  However, Berger and Udell (2002) offer a novel alternative 
hypothesis – the institutional memory hypothesis – which states that the abilities of loan officers to monitor 
risky loans deteriorates over the business cycle.   Thus, credit assessment skills atrophy as the time since 
the last recession increases, thereby sowing the seeds of the next business downturn as loans are 
inappropriately extended and insufficiently monitored.  Other behavioral explanations for procyclicality in  
default risk are “disaster myopia,” “cognitive dissonance” and “herding behavior” because there is a 
tendency to underestimate extremely low probability, high loss events that do not conform to “prevailing 
beliefs.”  See Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001). 
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we describe models that examine the recovery rate (or one minus the recovery rate, the 
loss given default LGD) as a function of macroeconomic factors.  In Section 5, we 
examine the correlation between PD and LGD.  The procyclical flight to quality and the 
impact of systemic factors on the exposure at default (EAD) are examined in Section 6 
and the paper concludes in Section 7. 
 
2. What is Procyclicality? 
It is almost axiomatic that defaults and credit problems would multiply in times of 
distressed macroeconomic conditions.  Moreover, good economic times provide the 
rising tide that lifts even the shakiest of financial boats.  Thus, ex post realizations of 
credit problems display clear procyclical patterns – increasing during recessions and 
decreasing during expansions.  However, these patterns may be consistent with fixed 
portfolio loss distributions that have no systematic risk factors in either the PD, the LGD 
or the EAD.  That is, realizations of credit losses (say, point A on loss distribution 1 in 
Figure 1) may increase during recessions, whereas economic expansions may, by 
definition, yield ex post realizations such as point B on the same loss distribution 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
In contrast to these shifts along a fixed distribution, procyclicality considers the 
shift in the entire loss distribution to reflect ex ante changes in credit risk exposure; 
shown in Figure 1 as the shift from loss distribution 1 in a “good” economy to loss 
distribution 2 in a “bad” economy.  That is, if point A is a bad ex post realization of 
portfolio value on a stable loss distribution 1, then the portfolio’s ex ante risk exposure is 
not affected by systematic risk factors.  If, however, during good economic times we 
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observe a value of portfolio losses corresponding to point B on loss distribution 1 and 
during bad economic times we observe a loss value corresponding to point A on loss 
distribution 2, then there is an ex ante procyclical shift in risk exposure.  That is, the 
entire distribution of portfolio losses shifts in response to macroeconomic factors.  Of 
course, since point A lies on both loss distributions, it is empirically difficult to 
disentangle ex ante procyclical shifts in risk from merely ex post realizations.  This 
survey focuses on studies that attempt to measure procyclicality by modeling systematic 
shifts in the entire loss distribution in order to distinguish between the two 
observationally identical representations of point A in Figure 1. 
 
3. Cyclical Effects on the Probability of Default (PD) 
There is substantial anecdotal evidence to suggest that macroeconomic conditions 
impact the probability of default (PD).  Fama (1986) and Wilson (1997) find cyclical 
PDs, especially in the case of economic downturns when PDs increase dramatically.  
Ferri, Liu and Majnoni (2000), Monfort and Mulder (2000) and Reisen (2000) find 
evidence that ratings agencies behave cyclically, particularly with respect to setting credit 
ratings for sovereign country debt.  When using external credit ratings as a measure of 
credit quality, a distinction must be made between “point-in-time” and “through-the-
cycle” risk assessment.  This is most relevant in the context of interpreting external credit 
ratings that are designed to be “through-the-cycle” assessments of the default probability 
over the life of the loan.  Thus, the PD is estimated at the worst point in the cycle 
expected to prevail over the debt maturity time horizon.5  In contrast, “point-in-time” 
assessments of PD respond to changes in cyclical conditions.  Crouhy, Galai and Mark 
                                                 
5 Most ratings are reviewed at least once a year to update their accuracy. 
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(2001) contend that “through-the-cycle” ratings are a more appropriate input into lending 
decisions, whereas “point-in-time” ratings are more appropriate for the purposes of 
capital allocation.   
Bangia, Diebold and Schuermann (2000) and Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto 
(2000) find evidence of macroeconomic and industry effects on rating transitions.  That 
is, ratings downgrades and defaults are more likely during downturns in economic 
activity.  Carey (1998) documents significant differences in default rates for “good” 
years, as compared to “bad” years.  Falkenheim and Powell (1999) find that 15 out of 21 
industries in Argentina have positively correlated PDs.6   
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
Table 1, reproduced from Altman and Brady (2001), shows the apparent 
relationship between PD and macroeconomic conditions.  Default rates exceeded 10% in 
the recession years 1990-1991.  Moreover, the economic downturn in the year 2000 
corresponded to significant increases in default rates as compared to the low default rates 
experienced during the 1993-1998 boom period.  While suggestive, the results in Table 1 
cannot distinguish between the two possibilities shown in Figure 1 - an actual increase in 
ex ante PD during recessions (i.e., a shift from loss distribution 1 to loss distribution 2 in 
Figure 1) as opposed to simply an increase in the ex post realization of defaults during 
bad times (i.e., a shift from point B to point A along a fixed loss distribution 1).  That is, 
it is unclear whether the default rates in Table 1 are indicators of the ex ante risk of 
default.  If so, they would indicate the existence of a cyclical component in PD.  
                                                 
6 Most studies utilize US data to estimate credit risk exposure.  It is unclear whether the results are 
generalizable for other countries, particularly those with different bankruptcy regulations.  For example, 
Korea has higher bank closure rates than Japan, and therefore Korean banks have recovered more quickly 
than have Japanese banks from the effects of bad loans in their portfolios. 
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Alternatively, however, the default rates in Table 1 may simply be ex post realizations of 
defaults that are, by definition, in the upper (lower) range of the loss distribution during 
bad (good) years.  Moreover, Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) point out that the observed 
cyclicality in default rates may be an artifact of timing in a mean reverting PD function.  
That is, the “aging effect” stipulates that it takes around three or four years after 
origination for defaults to be realized [see Altman and Kishore (1996)].  If more debt 
instruments originate during cyclical upturns than during downturns, then a relatively 
large number of bonds will reach “default age” three or four years after the end of the 
expansionary period.  Even if a fixed percentage of these bonds defaults, the absolute 
number of defaults will rise.  This increase in defaults is likely to coincide with a cyclical 
decline in economic activity, thereby creating a spurious procyclical pattern. 
To distinguish between the two alternatives shown in Figure 1, we must estimate 
the PD conditional on macroeconomic factors.  It is to this task that we now turn.  We 
first describe academic models, then proprietary models, and finally, the impact of 
cyclical factors on the BIS capital proposals. 
3.1 Academic Models 
Modern methods of credit risk measurement can be traced to two alternative 
branches in the asset pricing literature of academic finance: an options-theoretic 
structural approach pioneered by Merton (1974) and a reduced form approach utilizing 
intensity-based models to estimate stochastic hazard rates, following a literature 
pioneered by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997), and 
Duffie and Singleton (1998, 1999).  These two schools of thought offer differing 
methodologies to accomplish the central task of all credit risk measurement models – 
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estimation of default probabilities.  The structural approach models the economic process 
of default, whereas reduced form models decompose risky debt prices in order to estimate 
the random intensity process underlying default.7 
3.1.1 Structural Models of Cyclical Effects on PD 
 Structural models measure the cyclical impact on PD by incorporating systemic 
risk factors into the specification of the stochastic asset diffusion process.  Since default 
occurs in a structural model when the market value of assets falls to the default point (set 
equal to the face value of debt), then the PD depends on the distance between the market 
value of assets and the default point during the credit horizon period (usually assumed to 
be one year).  The default region is shown in Figure 2 as the shaded area in which the 
market value of assets is less than the face value of debt.  Forecasting the distribution of 
asset values in one year’s time is therefore critical to the determination of PD in a 
structural model.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
In this section, we focus on the impact on PD of systematic fluctuations in asset 
values.  However, the existence of procyclical shifts in the default point (i.e., leverage 
amounts) may also induce cyclical PDs.  That is, when economic conditions deteriorate, 
shareholders may be more likely to extract concessions from debtholders that lower the 
default point, say, from B1 to B2 in Figure 2.  These possible deviations from absolute 
priority occur when liquidation costs are very high.8  Thus, debtholders may be willing to 
                                                 
7 The two approaches can be reconciled if asset values follow a random intensity-based process, with 
shocks that may not be fully observed because of imperfect accounting disclosures.  See Duffie and Lando 
(2001) and Zhou (2001). 
8 For example, the boundary will become stochastic if there is liquidation cost to asset values.  This gives 
borrowers the power to renegotiate; see Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). Also Leland (1994), Anderson, 
Sundaresan, and Tychon (1996), and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) allow for debt renegotiations (i.e., 
renegotiations of the debt boundary value, or B in the context of a structural model). 
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reduce the face value of the debt so as to avoid the high deadweight costs of bankruptcy 
and liquidation of assets.  If lenders are more likely to renegotiate debt in recessions than 
during expansions9 and if asset volatilities are unchanged, then decreases (increases) in 
economic activity would coincide with decreases (increases) in PD, as shown in Figure 2 
by the smaller shaded area under default point B2 as compared to the shaded area under 
point B1.10   However, if asset volatility increases (decreases) during recessions 
(expansions), there would be a procyclical pattern in PD such that PD increases during 
recessions and decreases during expansions.  Which of these two effects dominates is a 
matter for empirical investigation, although the anecdotal evidence suggests that the asset 
volatility effect dominates the effect of a cyclical shift in the default point.  In the 
remainder of this section, we examine academic studies of the relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions, fluctuations in asset values and default probabilities.11   
The consensus in this branch of the literature is that asset values and PDs tend to 
be positively correlated across obligors.  Moreover, PD is time-varying and regime 
dependent.  Firm interdependence (such as industry effects) can produce correlated PDs.  
In addition, cyclical effects in asset valuations and shifts in regime (due to structural, 
regulatory, or economic factors) impact PD. There is also evidence that default 
correlations are higher for low credit quality firms than for highly rated firms.  We turn 
now to a brief survey of some of the papers that comprise this literature. 
                                                 
9 Lenders may be more amenable to debt renegotiation during recessions than in expansions because they 
themselves may be experiencing financial distress, or in order to avoid the liquidation of the borrowing 
firm’s assets just at the time in the business cycle that asset values are depressed. 
10 However, recovery rates would fall during recessions since lenders are induced to make concessions that 
reduce the payout on the debt in the event of eventual default.  Thus, shifts in the default point may induce 
procyclical shifts in LGD; see Section 4. 
11 We discuss cyclical shifts in the default point in Section 6 in the context of procyclicality in EAD and 
endogenous leverage ratios. 
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Fridson, Garman and Wu (1997) find a relation between macroeconomic 
conditions and PD.  In particular, they find that as real interest rates increase, asset values 
decrease, thereby increasing the estimate of PD in a structural model.  They find a two 
year lag in the interest rate effect because of the existence of a cushion of cash reserves or 
a lag until debt payment date that may allow even insolvent firms to delay default.   Since 
risk-free interest rates are negatively are negatively correlated with the market index 
(Barnhill and Maxwell (1999) report a correlation coefficient of –0.33), the Fridson, 
Garman and Wu (1997) result implies a positive correlations between PD and the overall 
market index. 
 Barnhill and Maxwell (1999) simulate asset distributions that are conditional on 
macroeconomic conditions.12  They find that systematic risk exposure increases as credit 
quality deteriorates.  Moreover, since average credit quality declines as economic 
conditions deteriorate, there is an increased sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions in 
downturns.  Table 2 shows their results.  The average level of systematic risk (as 
measured by the equity beta) increases monotonically as credit quality (measured by 
simulated external credit ratings13) deteriorates.  Moreover, the beta (i.e., the systematic 
risk coefficient) for firms with high volatility (i.e., higher than average historical 
volatility in stock price) is always greater than or equal to the beta for low volatility 
firms.  Thus, if external credit ratings are accurate indicators of PD, Barnhill and 
                                                 
12 Although Barnhill and Maxwell (1999) incorporate a cyclical factor into their simulations of transmission 
matrices (including PD), they assume that recovery rates are stochastic with a known mean (34%) and 
standard deviation (25%) unrelated to macroeconomic factors.  This recovery rate distribution is taken from 
Altman and Kishore (1996). 
13 Barnhill and Maxwell (1999) simulate debt/equity ratios, which are then mapped into a simulated bond 
rating such that the bond rating indicates declines in quality as the debt ratio increases.  This is equivalent 
to assuming a constant volatility for the value of the firm.  Testing their simulations against actual US bond 
data over the period 1993-1998, they find that their model performs well for credit ratings Aaa through 
Baa, but poorly for the Caa/C category. 
 12 
Maxwell’s simulation results are consistent with the existence of a cyclical effect on PD, 
particularly for poor credit quality firms.   
INSERT TABLE 2 and FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
Indeed, the cyclical effect is stronger when the economy enters into a recession.  
Figure 3 shows how the systematic risk factors impact the PD in a structural model.  
Panel A (B) shows the stochastic process determining asset values over the credit horizon 
for a low volatility/high credit quality (high volatility/low credit quality) firm.  A 
recession tends to reduce asset values for both firms, thereby increasing the area of the 
default region, and thus increasing the PD.  However, the downward shift in asset values 
is greater for the high volatility/low credit quality firm, demonstrating that the procyclical 
impact on PD is stronger than for the low volatility/high credit quality firm. 
Gersbach and Lipponer (2000) also find that default correlations increase 
(decrease) as credit quality deteriorates (improves).  Following from their assumption that 
the default distribution is derived from the jointly log normal asset distributions of each 
pair of firms, the correlation between default probabilities is always less than the 
correlation between asset values.14  Table 3 shows these results for asset return 
correlations assumed to be 40% and 80%.  Default correlations increase monotonically as 
PD increases for both levels of asset correlation.  Moreover, default correlations under 
the 80% asset correlation assumption always exceed the default correlations under the 
40% asset correlation assumption. 
                                                 
14 Although the precise functional form presented by Gersbach and Lipponer (2000) for the PD correlation 
stems from the counterfactual assumption of log normally distributed asset returns, we can offer some 
economic intuition for the result that default correlations are less than asset correlations.  Joint defaults 
occur only if the assets of both firms fall below each firm’s debt obligations.  Thus, even if the two firms 
have positively correlated assets, the default of one firm may not coincide with asset returns in the other 
firm that are low enough to cause default in the other firm. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
Gersbach and Lipponer (2000) also examine the impact of macroeconomic shocks 
(measured as interest rate shocks) on default correlations for loan portfolios, holding 
constant both asset correlations and default probabilities.15  They find that 
macroeconomic shocks increase positive default correlations, thereby engendering 
procyclical effects as portfolio diversification benefits decline (i.e., both PD and default 
correlations increase) in economic downturns.  This procyclical effect is significant – on 
the order of 30% of the increase in credit risk when initial PD is 5% for initial default 
correlations of 14.6%.  This result is supported by a paper by Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2001) that focuses on the relationship between the market value of assets and 
the default point.  Thus, as the default risk-free rate increases, asset values decline, 
thereby causing an increase in PD, or a positive correlation between changes in default 
risk-free interest rates and default risk.   
Zhou (2001) uses a first passage time model to ascertain the time until the asset 
value reaches the default point (assumed to be fixed at the value of short term liabilities 
plus one half of all long term liabilities); i.e., the expected time until default.  Zhou’s 
(2001) results are consistent with those of the previously cited studies in that he finds 
stronger macroeconomic effects for low credit quality firms than for high credit quality 
firms.  Since the credit quality of the firm is itself dynamic, Zhou (2001) contends that 
the cyclical effects on PD are also dynamic.  Using an assumption that the correlation 
                                                 
15 Gersbach and Lipponer (2000) assume a fixed recovery rate that is a percentage of the outstanding debt 
obligation.  Their results present a lower bound of the impact of procyclicality because all of the fixed 
terms (PD, asset correlations and LGD) actually have procyclical components. 
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between asset values is 40%,16 Zhou (2001) finds that default correlations increase as the 
time to maturity increases17 and as the credit quality decreases.  See Table 4 for a 
summary of these results.  However, the observed pattern in default correlations may or 
may not be a function of business cycle effects, as Zhou (2001) finds evidence that 
default (particularly for short maturity debt) is idiosyncratic and related to unexplained  
jumps in the asset diffusion process. 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000, 2001) also find that the most speculative risk 
classifications’ default probabilities are most sensitive to shifts in macroeconomic 
conditions.  That is, PD correlations are highest for low quality firms.  In particular, they 
find the existence of an asymmetric procyclical impact on PDs such that default 
probabilities increase significantly during economic downturns, but do not decrease 
significantly during economic upturns.  That is, a recession is sufficient to force many 
marginal firms into default, thereby causing large increases in both PDs and default 
correlations for these firms.  In contrast, an economic boom is insufficient to lift many of 
these firms’ credit quality, thereby reducing the correlation across firm PDs.  Stated 
simply, business recovery is driven more by firm specific factors, whereas business 
failure is more systematic. 
                                                 
16 The 40% estimate of asset correlations approximates the correlation in equity values, adjusted for 
leverage.  However, this relationship holds only for high credit quality (generally, low leverage) firms.  
Jarrow, Van Deventer, and Wang (2002) show that structural models perform quite poorly for highly 
leveraged firms. 
17 Using a standard Merton options pricing model, Zhou (2001) presents a similar term structure of default 
correlations (i.e., default correlations increase as the time to maturity increases), although the Merton 
model obtains significantly lower estimated default correlations than does the Zhou (2001) first passage 
time model.  This is because the Merton model ignores the possibility of early default and only focuses on 
default at the fixed credit time horizon (the debt’s maturity date), whereas the first passage time model 
estimates the probability that asset values will fall below the default time at any time horizon. 
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 Longin and Solnik (2001) also find evidence of asymmetric procyclicality.   
Using extreme value theory, they find increases in correlations across international equity 
markets during bear markets, but not in bull markets.  Since structural models use equity 
prices to estimate PD, Longin and Solnik’s (2001) results imply that default correlations 
should increase during economic downturns, but not necessarily during economic 
upturns.18 
 Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) may resolve some of the controversy about 
whether default correlations are directly or inversely related to PD.  Using a structural 
model and a fixed, exogenous LGD, they divide the correlation effect into a skewness 
effect (SE) and a distance-of default effect (DDE).  That is, systematic risk factors that 
increase PD levels tend to move the observations into the extreme portions of the default 
distribution that are more highly skewed; that is, there is more divergence among the PDs 
for individual firms.19  Since the greater the skewness, the less information is revealed 
about the correlated underlying firm asset returns, then increases in skewness result in 
decreases in default correlations.  Thus, the relationship between default correlations and 
the PD is shaped like an inverted U – it increases for the region up until PD=50% and 
then decreases thereafter.20  However, there is a countervailing distance-of default effect 
(DDE), which is monotonically decreasing as PD increases.  That is, if one firm’s PD 
increases and the other firm’s PD stays the same, it is tautological that both firms’ PDs 
will diverge and the correlation between their PDs will decrease.  The observed 
                                                 
18 Longin and Solnik (2000) do not study PD and LGD correlations directly.  However, if LGD is also a 
function of equity prices, then their results are consistent with increases in LGD correlation during bear 
markets, but not in bull markets. 
19 Alternatively, if extreme regions of the default distribution obtain from systematic risk factors that make 
idiosyncratic risk less important, then increases in skewness would result in increased default correlation.  
This possibility is considered in Section 4 in the context of endogenous LGD.  
20 Since a PD>50% is not economically reasonable, Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) only consider the 
upward sloping region of the skewness effect. 
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relationship between the level of PD and the default correlation nets the SE and the 
offsetting DDE.  Based on their simulation results, Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) 
contend that the SE effect dominates the DDE effect in the relevant range.  Therefore, 
default correlations tend to increase as PD increases. 
 Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) also observe that the impact of cyclical effects 
on PD levels and correlations is only part of the picture.  They find that the standard 
deviation of default rates vary throughout the business cycle.  That is, extreme economic 
conditions (booms and busts) are characterized by two and three fold increases in 
portfolio standard deviation in addition to shifts in default correlations.   
3.1.2 Reduced Form Models of Cyclical Effects on PD 
 
Reduced form models decompose observed credit spreads to detect the term 
structure of default probabilities.  Thus, reduced form models do not examine the 
structural factors leading to default.  Rather PD is modeled using the stochastic intensity 
function that best fits the yield curve data, as shown in Figure 4.  The credit spread, 
denoted CS, is the premium included in the yield on zero coupon, risky debt over the 
yield on same duration/maturity, zero coupon, default risk-free debt.  If CS is a pure risk 
premium for credit risk exposure,21 then risk neutral security pricing implies that CS = 
PD x LGD.  In this section, we will discuss how reduced form models decompose the 
credit spread in order to solve for PD.  In Section 4.1.2, we decompose the credit spread 
in order to solve for LGD. 
                                                 
21 This may not be the case if there is a liquidity risk premium or other noise in debt prices such that the 
yield spread is not a pure credit risk premium.  See discussion in Chapter 5 of Saunders and Allen (2002). 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
Duffie and Singleton (1998) model an intensity function with both idiosyncratic 
and systematic factors.  The model can incorporate multiple systematic factors.  The 
cyclical effect is observed in the correlated Poisson arrivals of randomly sized jumps in 
default intensities.  Moreover, Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Lando (1998) model the 
cyclical component as a function of the short term risk-free interest rate (where interest 
rates are inversely correlated with the market index).  However, this specification does 
not obtain estimates of PD that exhibit the cyclicality in PDs observed in anecdotal 
evidence. 
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2001) apply the Duffie and Singleton (1999) 
model to European government bond spreads, defined to be the spread over German 
sovereign bonds (assumed to be default risk-free) on sovereign government bonds issued 
by Austria, Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain.  They find strong evidence of a 
global systematic risk factor as well as idiosyncratic country risk factors for each issuer 
over the period 1999-2000.  The global risk factor represents the average level of yield 
spreads across all countries and across all maturities.  Table 5 shows that Belgium, Italy 
and Spain are more strongly related to the global factor than are Austria and the 
Netherlands. 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
 Das, Freed, Gang and Kapadia (2001) and Das, Fong and Geng (2001) use an 
intensity-based model to detect cyclical default probabilities.   Their results parallel those 
of Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000, 2001) in that PD correlations among US non-financial 
public firms over the period January 1987 to October 2000 are estimated to be higher 
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when markets move down (i.e., PD levels are high on average) in contrast to when 
markets move up (PD levels are low).  Moreover, Table 6 shows that their results differ 
from many of the papers presented in Section 3.1.2 [e.g., Barnhill and Maxwell (1999), 
Gersbach and Lipponer (2000), Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001), Crouhy et al. (2000, 
2001) and Zhou (2001)] in that default correlations increase as credit quality improves.  
That is, PD across high credit quality firms may be higher at times than for low credit 
quality firms because high quality firms have less idiosyncratic risk in their balance 
sheets than do low quality firms.  Moreover, Das, Freed, Geng and Kapadia (2001) 
hypothesize that PD correlations fluctuate over time.  They use US bond data over the 
period 1987-2000 to estimate a switching of regression regimes model that endogenizes 
the time period cut-off points. The time period regimes do not conform to business 
cycles, suggesting that fluctuations in PD correlations are not necessarily cyclical.  
Moreover, the highest correlation is found for the earliest period in their sample: January 
1987 – April 1990, a period that includes both recession and non-recession years.  Das, 
Fong and Geng (2001) show that ignoring these time-varying correlations in default 
probabilities results in substantial underestimates of credit risk exposure. 
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
 Jarrow and Yu (2001) consider a doubly stochastic Poisson process.22  The default 
intensity depends on macroeconomic factors and an interdependence term linking firms 
across industries and sectors.  Thus, correlations across PDs arise because of both a 
systematic risk factor and a counterparty risk factor that is essentially an exposure to 
other firms’ idiosyncratic risk.  This counterparty risk may emanate from exposure to 
                                                 
22 In a doubly stochastic Poisson process (also known as a “Cox process”), the intensity of default (i.e., the 
PD per unit of time) is itself a stochastic process that depends on a set of macroeconomic state variables.   
 19 
suppliers as in vertically integrated manufacturing processes (e.g., GM’s exposure when 
Delphi’s workers went on strike in 1998), access to capital (e.g., the Asian financial crisis 
stemming from nonperforming loans to several industrial conglomerates), and contagion 
effects (e.g., the impact of Long Term Capital Management’s potential default on its 
bankers).  Jarrow and Yu (2001) find that consideration of counterparty risk factors 
results in estimates of PD that exhibit the observed clustering in defaults found during 
economic downturns. 
 Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2001) estimate a three factor credit risk model that 
depends on systematic (observable economic) factors and firm-specific distress variables 
(such as leverage, book-to-market, profitability, lagged credit spread, and scaled equity 
price).  The systematic factors are the default risk-free interest rate and its stochastic long 
run mean.23  Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2001) find that the interest rate factors are 
important determinants of the credit spread.  Moreover, the idiosyncratic factors 
representing firm distress (particularly the leverage and book-to-market variables) reduce 
out-of-sample fitting errors for a sample of US corporate bonds (without embedded 
options) issued from January 1973 to March 1998.   However, the model performs better 
for high credit quality bonds than for higher risk bonds. 
3.2 Proprietary Models 
KMV offers a proprietary model based on the options theoretic structural 
approach.  Estimates of default correlations range from 0.2% to 15%.  However, default 
                                                 
23 Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2001) estimate their model using monthly data.  Two interest rate factors are 
used to reduce errors in measuring the default risk-free rate.  They use daily quotes on three month 
Treasury STRIPS to calculate the daily pricing error (as compared to the model price using a term structure 
model).   For each month, they then construct a smoothed parameter vector that minimizes the root mean-
squared percentage pricing error.  Thus, both the market price and the smoothed mean value are used in the 
reduced form model. 
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correlations have increased over time as the overall level of leverage has increased.  
KMV considers the systematic factors impacting default correlations using a three level 
approach.  The first level incorporates a composite market risk factor.  The second level 
includes an industry and country risk factor.  The third level contains regional factors 
(Europe, North America, Japan, Southeast Asia, Australia/New Zealand) and sectoral 
indicators (interest sensitive, extraction, consumer non-durables, consumer durables, 
technology, medical services, and other).  The factor loadings (i.e., systematic risk 
sensitivities) for any individual firm for each of the factors in the three level model are 
estimated using asset variances obtained from the options theoretic model.  Then the 
factor loadings are used to calculate covariances for each pair of firms.  Finally, the 
correlation coefficient is calculated using the standard formula of scaling down the 
covariance by the product of the two firms’ standard deviations.  However, KMV does 
not explicitly consider a cyclical factor in their estimation of empirical EDF scores, 
although the regional and sectoral factors are impacted by macroeconomic conditions. 
Once the covariance between each pair of firms’ equity returns is calculated, it is 
combined with each firm’s KMV EDF score in order to obtain an estimate of the 
correlation coefficient.  The empirical EDF combines the option theoretic approach with 
the use of an empirical database representing the historical asset distribution function.24  
That is, the distance to default is calculated using the asset value and asset volatility 
obtained from the options pricing model.  Then the one-year empirical EDF is calculated 
by referring to the percentage of defaults in a sample of firms with the same initial 
distance to default.  The empirical EDF is not a risk-neutral PD because it uses actual 
default experience that includes a risk-adjusted required rate of return; therefore, the 
                                                 
24 Merton’s (1974) assumption of normally distributed assets results in widely erroneous model estimates. 
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empirical EDF is biased downward.  To transform the empirical EDF into the higher risk-
neutral PD (denoted QDF by KMV), a single index model is estimated to calculate the 
return to systematic risk.  The options pricing model is then re-estimated, adjusted for the 
systematic risk premium over the risk-free rate. 
CreditMetrics is a structural approach, proprietary Value at Risk (VaR) model that 
is based on credit transition matrices that estimate the probability of credit migration 
downward to default or to another credit rating.  Estimates of default correlations range 
from 0.13%  to 3.3%.  The credit transition matrix can be conditioned on cyclical factors 
using a shift term called the credit cycle index, the Z factor, modeled as a shift term that 
shifts the entire return distribution down (up) when economic conditions deteriorate 
(improve). Finger (1999) shows that the credit cycle index is obtained by regressing 
default rates for speculative grade (Ba & below) bonds on: the credit spread between Aaa 
and Baa, 10 year US Treasury bond yields and growth rates in the CPI and GDP.  Kim 
(1999) backtests the model and finds that incorporating cyclical factors reduces errors by 
30% compared to the historical average transition matrix.  Thus, the conditional PD that 
reflects the loan’s sensitivity to macroeconomic factors appears to outperform the 
unconditional PD, suggesting that cyclical factors are important determinants of PD.  
This is further supported by Belkin, Suchower and Forest (1998) who estimate the 
systematic risk premium incorporated in a simulated loan portfolio consisting of 10,000 
loans with the same credit ratings and with credit migration correlations of 25%.  Table 7 
shows their results.  The systematic risk premium increases steadily as credit quality 
(measured by credit rating) declines, ranging from 4.6 basis points for Aaa rated loan 
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portfolios to 839 basis points for Caa rated loan portfolios, thereby implying an increase 
in the cyclical component of credit spreads as the credit quality declines. 
INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
Each cell in the credit transition matrix shows the probability that a particular 
obligor, rated at a given grade at the beginning of the period, will move to another rating 
by the end of the period.  CreditPortfolio View, using the structural approach, asserts that 
the probability of downgrades (upgrades) increases in bad (good) economic periods.  
Thus, the conditional transition matrix represents the migration probabilities for each cell, 
conditional on the state of the macroeconomy that is expected to prevail at the credit 
horizon.  The model uses a distributed lag model to forecast macroeconomic conditions 
based on both fundamental macroeconomic variables and idiosyncratic risk factors.  Each 
transition probability is computed as a function of the macroeconomic forecast and 
diffused through the migration matrix.  Different conditional transition matrices can be 
estimated for different credit horizons corresponding to fluctuations in macroeconomic 
conditions.25  For example, Saunders and Allen (2002) show how the unconditional credit 
transition matrix (reproduced in Table 8 for only four credit migrations: C to A; C to B; C 
to C; and C to default) can be transformed into a conditional transition matrix for a 
cyclical downturn.  As shown in Table 8, the probability of transition from an initial 
rating of C to default has increased from 15% to 17.4% as a result of the deterioration in 
economic conditions.  Interestingly, the probability of an upgrade from C to A has also 
increased (from 1% to 1.24%) because credit upgrades during cyclical downturns are 
more likely to result from idiosyncratic firm specific factors.  Thus, recessions increase 
                                                 
25 Although CreditMetrics and CreditPortfolio View can incorporate cyclical effects into estimates of PD, 
this is not done for LGD. 
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the likelihood of extreme outcomes and decrease the likelihood that credit quality will 
remain substantially unchanged. 
INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
 
Credit Risk Plus stands in direct contrast to CreditMetrics and CreditPortfolio 
View in its objectives and its theoretical foundations. CreditMetrics and CreditPortfolio 
View seek to estimate the full VaR of a loan or loan portfolio by viewing rating upgrades 
and downgrades and the associated effects of spread changes in the discount rate as part 
of the VaR exposure of a loan. Credit Risk Plus is an intensity-based model that views 
spread risk as part of market risk rather than credit risk. As a result, in any period, only 
two states of the world are considered - default and non-default - and the focus is on 
measuring expected and unexpected losses rather than expected value and unexpected 
changes in value (or VaR) as under CreditMetrics or CreditPortfolio View.  In the 
extended Credit Risk Plus model, there are three types of uncertainty: (1) the uncertainty 
of the mean default rate, (2) the uncertainty about the severity of loss26, and (3) the 
uncertainty about the mean default rate itself (modeled as a gamma distribution).  Credit 
Risk Plus derives a closed form solution for the loss distribution by assuming that these 
types of uncertainty are all independent.27  Thus, Credit Risk Plus distinguishes between 
ex ante procyclicality and ex post realizations as shown in Figure 1 by estimating shifts in 
the mean of the loss distribution. 
Cyclical factors are incorporated into Credit Risk Plus by allowing the mean 
default rate itself to vary over time or over the business cycle. For example, in economic 
expansions, the mean default rate will be low; in economic contractions, it may rise 
                                                 
26 Credit Risk Plus does not adjust the loss severity for systematic risk exposure. 
27 The assumption of independence may be violated if the volatility in mean default rates reflects the 
correlation of default events through interrlated macroeconomic factors.  
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significantly (e.g., a shift from loss distribution 1 to loss distribution 2 in Figure 1).  
Credit Risk Plus models find that default correlations are highest for the lowest quality 
firms, supporting earlier academic results.  However, the Credit Risk Plus model does not 
consider the possibility that cyclical factors affect all three sources of uncertainty (i.e., the 
mean PD, the LGD and the uncertainty around the mean PD).   That is, only a shift in 
means is considered; not a shift in the standard deviation, skewness or kurtosis of the 
distribution as might be observed in the shift from loss distribution 1 to 2 in Figure 1. 
Kamakura’s Risk Manager (KRM) is a reduced form proprietary model that uses 
bond prices, equity prices, and accounting data in order to solve for a default intensity 
function.  The default intensity process is modeled as a function of stochastic default-free 
interest rates, liquidity factors, and lognormal risk factors, such as a stochastic process for 
the market index.  Thus, Kamakura models cyclical factors using an equity price index.  
Macroeconomic conditions therefore impact PD through the systematic risk component 
of equity prices.  
KRM is based on Jarrow (2001).  Credit spreads are decomposed into PD and 
LGD by the use of both debt and equity prices in order to better separate the default 
intensity process from the loss recovery process.28  The default hazard rate is modeled as 
a function of stochastic default-free interest rates, liquidity factors, and lognormal risk 
factors, such as a stochastic process for the market index.  KRM is benchmarked using 
credit spreads or bond prices, equity prices, and accounting data over a period of 1962 to 
1990, with out of sample forecasting over 1991 to 1999.   The five explanatory variables, 
denoted X(t), used to parameterize the system are: (1) return on assets = (net 
                                                 
28 Jarrow (2001) makes the interesting point that, prior to this work, structural models used only equity 
prices, eschewing debt prices as too noisy, whereas reduced form models used only debt prices.  This is 
claimed to be the first model to combine both debt and equity prices in an intensity-based format. 
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income)/(total assets); (2) leverage = (total liabilities)/(total assets); (3) relative size = 
(firm equity value)/(total market value of the NYSE and AMEX); (4) excess return 
(monthly) over the CRSP NYSE/AMEX index return; and  (5) monthly equity volatility.   
Reduced form models are subject to error because observed credit spreads 
incorporate noise and other factors such as liquidity risk premiums in addition to pure 
credit risk premiums.  The liquidity factor is modeled in KRM as a convenience yield, 
such that when the supply of a particular issue is tight (i.e., when one cannot buy the 
issue because asking prices are high and special rates on repurchase agreements are low), 
then there is a positive convenience yield incorporated into bond spreads.  Alternatively, 
when there is a glut of a particular issue (i.e., in times of credit crises and high market 
volatilities, when some bonds can only be sold at discount prices), then there is a negative 
convenience yield incorporated into bond spreads.  The Jarrow model measures liquidity 
risk by estimating these convenience yields implicit in bond prices.  
Recovery rates are modeled as a fixed percentage of debt prices just prior to 
default, with equity prices used to determine that percentage.29   That is, since the equity 
price is not a function of either the liquidity premium or the LGD and the bond price is a 
function of both variables (as well as others), then the use of both price series can be used 
to separate out the LGD from the PD.  Prices can be expressed as: 
Bond Prices:      B = B[t, T, i, λ(t, X(t)), δ(t, X(t)), γ(t,T,X(t)), µ, S(t,X(t))] 
Equity Prices:   ξ = ξ[ t, T, i, λ(t, X(t)), µ, S(t,X(t))] 
 
where t is the current period; T is the bond’s time to maturity; i is the stochastic default-
free interest rate process; λ(t, X(t)) is the default intensity process, i.e., the risk neutral 
                                                 
29 Equity prices consist of a stream of dividend payments plus a “liquidating dividend” which is the 
payment to the equity holder in the event of default on the firm’s debt.  Since equity represents the residual 
claim on the firm’s assets, the implied value of this liquidating dividend can be used to solve for the 
bondholders’ LGD. 
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PD; δ(t, X(t)) is the recovery rate (1 – LGD); γ(t,T,X(t)) is the liquidity premium; µ is a 
stock market bubble factor; and S(t,X(t)) is the liquidating dividend on equity in the event 
of bond default.  Thus, KRM is the only proprietary model that incorporates cyclical 
factors into both PD and LGD. 
3.3 The BIS Basel Capital Accord 
The January 2001 proposals for the new Basel Capital Accord specify a constant 
default correlation of 20% in the Internal Ratings-Based Approach models.  In the 
November 2001 proposed modifications, this specification was changed and calibrated to 
a range between 10-20%.  The November 2001 proposals specify an inverse relationship 
between the PD and default correlations (denoted R), as follows: 
R = 0.10 x [(1-exp-50PD)/(1-exp-50)] + 0.20 x [1 – (1-exp-50PD)/(1-exp-50]          (1) 
The specification in equation (1) contradicts studies that show that correlations are 
highest for the lowest quality (high PD) firms.  That is, this specification is not supported 
by several academic studies cited earlier [e.g., Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001), Zhou 
(2001) and Barnhill and Maxwell (1999)], but is supported by Das, Freed, Gang and 
Kapadia (2001). 
Another criticism of the November 2001 proposed modifications of the Internal 
Ratings-Based Foundation Approach is that it understates the attainable level of default 
correlation by limiting it to an upper bound of 20%.  Gersbach and Wehrspohn (2001) 
suggest correlations that start around 25% for relatively unconcentrated portfolios up to 
35% for concentrated portfolios. They propose a “lean IRB model” that is considerably 
simpler than the Internal Ratings-Based models, but still incorporates multiple systematic 
risk factors.  This simplified IRB model would reduce the procyclicality of strict capital 
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adequacy rules by smoothing one year PD rates over the business cycle.  Similarly, 
Estrella (2001) proposes calibration of the VaR-based minimum capital requirement to 
the optimal capital during an economic downturn, rather than to an unconditional average 
across the business cycle.  Alternatively, Gersbach and Wehrspohn (2001) and Purhonen 
(2002) propose explicit reductions in capital requirements during recessions to limit the 
procyclicality inherent in the New Capital Accord proposed by the BIS. 
All BIS proposals aggregate regulatory capital simply by summing up the capital 
requirements for each asset individually. Gordy (2001) shows that this additivity 
assumption is correct only if the portfolio consists of an infinite number of atomistically 
small assets or if there is only a single systematic risk factor that drives all correlations in 
the model.  BIS II proposals recognize that these conditions are not likely to hold in 
practice and therefore imposes a granularity adjustment that is a function of PD.  Thus, if 
there is procyclicality in PD, there will be procyclicality in the granularity adjustment.  
Pykhtin and Dev (2002) obtain an analytical solution for the granularity adjustment that 
is a function of the systematic risk factor in both PD and LGD. 
In one of the few studies using international data, Purhonen (2002) finds evidence 
of considerable procyclicality in the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Foundation Approach 
to the New Capital Accords.  Using KMV empirical EDFs as a measure of internal 
ratings, he examines minimum capital requirements over the period November 1996 – 
June 2001 using both the January 2001 and November 2001 IRB calibrations.  He finds 
considerable cyclical effects across all regional portfolios: US, EU, Asia-Pacific and 
Latin America.  In particular, during the summer of 1998, during the Russian debt and 
Long Term Capital Management crises, the US banking system would have needed either 
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significant infusions of capital or would have had to significantly reduce lending and sell 
assets, thereby exacerbating the cyclical downturn.  Similar procyclical patterns were 
found for the EU and Latin American portfolios during the summer of 1998.   In contrast, 
the Asian portfolio experienced considerable increases in credit risk exposure in late 
1996, then again during the second half of 1998, and again during 2001.  Thus, the 
increased capital requirements implied by the procyclical IRB could have exacerbated the 
Japanese economic crisis.30 
Concern about excessive procyclicality in the New Capital Accord is misplaced 
according to Jordan, Peek and Rosengren (2002).  They find evidence of procyclical 
changes in capital requirements even in current regulations.  That is, even in today’s less 
risk sensitive environment, banks often experience declines (increases) in regulatory 
capital requirements during economic upturns (downturns), thereby exacerbating cyclical 
swings as capital-constrained banks cut down on lending during recessions and capital-
rich banks increase lending during expansions.  The current regulatory mechanism for 
these fluctuations is through mandated changes in provisioning for loan loss reserves.  
Rather than the automatic and continuous credit risk capital adjustment envisioned in the 
New Capital Accord, current credit risk adjustments to loan loss reserves often occur at 
discrete intervals, most often after a bank examination takes place.  That is, Jordan, Peek 
and Rosengren (2002) document abrupt losses of bank capital during recessions that 
occur around the time of bank examinations.31  For example, during the 1990 recession, 
banks experienced declines in their capital ratios of over 4% within a one year period.  
                                                 
30 Within the Asian portfolio, Japan accounted for 47% of the companies and 75% of the debt outstanding 
as of October 2001. 
31 Chiuri, Ferri and Majnoni (2002) find evidence of significant contractions in credit supply in emerging 
economies when regulatory capital requirements are more strictly enforced, although Saunders (2002) 
argues that risk-shifting could actually induce increases in the supply of credit. 
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Thus, greater credit risk sensitivity in the proposed new capital requirements may not 
change the inherent procyclicality in bank capital regulations, but merely the timing of 
the realization of the procyclical effects.32  This point of view is supported by proponents 
of the contention that the cause of the 1990-1991 credit crunch and recession can be 
attributed to increased capital requirements under the original BIS Basel Capital 
Accord.33   
 
4. Cyclical Effects on Loss Given Default (LGD) 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that systemic factors affect LGD as well as PD.34 
Altman and Kishore (1996) find that recovery rates are time-varying.  Altman (1989) 
finds significant correlations between recovery rates and external credit ratings just prior 
to default.  Dalianes (1999) refers to empirical evidence that recovery rates fluctuate over 
time and are negatively correlated with short term default risk-free interest rates because 
increases in interest rates (usually consistent with economic downturns) generally depress 
asset prices, thereby reducing recovery rates and increasing LGD.  Gupton, Gates, and 
Carty (2000) and Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000) find LGD variability around a mean 
value that is consistent with cyclical effects.  Machlachlan (1999) finds that credit spreads 
are highest and therefore bond prices lowest during low points in the business cycle.  This 
suggests a negative correlation between LGD and macroeconomic conditions because 
                                                 
32 Estrella (2001) finds that optimal capital levels lag credit risk exposure (as measured by VaR) by about 
one quarter of a business cycle.  Using data on US banks for 1984-1999, he finds procyclical patterns in 
external capital levels. 
33 Proponents of this view include Bernanke and Lown (1991), Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1995), Berger 
and Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995), and Lown and Peristiani (1996).  In contrast, opponents 
[such as Sharpe (1996)] argue that observed decreases in lending during capital-constrained downturns in 
economic activity may be the result of reduced loan demand rather than limitations in credit supply. 
34 However, Houweling and Vorst (2001) use a reduced form model to show that default swap prices are 
insensitive to the assumption of recovery values, although they do find a positive correlation between 
recovery rates and PD. 
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bond prices for distressed debt can be viewed as a lower bound on recovery amounts.   
Bangia, Diebold, and Schuermann (2000) use NBER designations of contractions and 
expansions to find that economic capital is 30% higher in a contraction year than in an 
expansion year, suggesting that loss rates (that is, PD x LGD) are procyclical. 
INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE 
 Table 9 shows some anecdotal evidence regarding the secular performance of 
LGD taken from Altman and Brady (2001).  Weighted average recovery rates for all 
securities are lowest (below 30%) in the recession years 1990 and 2000.35  In all other 
years, recovery rates exceed 30%.    However, as in the case of PD, it is unclear whether 
these results indicate that the higher LGD during a recession is only a bad realization on a 
fixed loss distribution (i.e., point A on loss distribution 1 in Figure 1) or represents an 
actual shift in ex ante LGD (i.e., point A on loss distribution 2 in Figure 1). 
Unfortunately, there has not been a lot of research into this question.  In the following 
sections, we discuss the models that attempt to measure the cyclical effects on the ex ante 
expected loss given default. 
 Virtually no research has investigated the impact of structural factors into LGD 
procyclicality.  For example, bankruptcy rules differ across countries and across time 
periods.  During periods of economic crisis, bankruptcy rules are often leniently applied, 
as in Japan during the past decade.  Moreover, as lenders prove more amenable to 
renegotiation during recessions, PD may decrease (since insolvent firms are allowed 
                                                 
35 Weighted average recovery rates are computed using closing bond prices on or as close to the default 
date as possible, weighted by the market value of defaulting debt issues for all publicly traded corporate 
bonds.  Ed Altman administers a bond database consisting of about 1,000 bonds for which reliable quotes 
are available. 
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forbearance in order to avoid default), but recovery rates also may decrease.  This results 
in procyclical increases in LGD during bad economic times.   
 The stringency of bankruptcy rules differs dramatically across countries.  In the 
US, management is granted an exclusivity period immediately upon entering Chapter 11 
during which the management cannot be removed (unless the courts find evidence of 
fraudulent behavior).  During this period (which may last as long as nine months), the 
managers have a choice – they can either undertake activities to increase firm value or 
they can pursue their own self-interest and allow firm value to deteriorate further.  To the 
extent that management concern about future employment prospects and personal 
reputation, as well as short term consumption of perquisites, outweighs the manager’s 
long term interest in the distressed firm, the end of the exclusivity period may find the 
firm’s creditors with substantially impaired assets, thereby reducing recovery rates and 
increasing LGD.   To the extent that procyclicality affects the likelihood of bankruptcy, 
then the legal and regulatory environment governing bankruptcy administration is 
relevant for credit risk assessment.  To our knowledge, this has not been incorporated into 
either academic or proprietary models. 
4.1 Academic Models 
Most academic and proprietary models make the simplifying assumption that 
recovery rates are exogenously determined.  Indeed, the earliest models assumed a LGD 
that was a fixed, known fraction of the debt value.  This was a critical assumption for 
reduced form models that enabled them to disentangle the PD from the LGD in the 
observed credit spread.  Second generation credit risk measurement models have just 
begun to address the cyclicality in LGD. 
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4.1.1 Structural Models of Cyclical Effects on LGD 
Structural models evaluate the PD as the likelihood that the market value of assets 
will fall to the default point (the debt value).  Once default occurs, debtholders receive 
the market value of the firm’s assets.  Thus, if there is a cyclical component built into 
asset valuations, then it also impacts recovery rates.  Despite this, most structural models 
[e.g., Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Hull and White (1995), and Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995)] assume that LGD is exogenously determined.  An exception to this 
is a series of papers by Frye.  Frye (2000b) uses a bond database to find evidence of 
cyclical recovery rates.  Table 10 shows that LGD increases dramatically for all levels of 
credit risk in depressed states of the world, as compared to normal macroeconomic 
conditions.  Thus, collateral values fluctuate with economic conditions.  Indeed, recovery 
rates may decline 20-25% in severe economic downturns.  Thus, Frye (2000b) cautions 
that “collateral should not lead to complacency” on the part of lenders.  Collateral values 
are particularly sensitive to economic downturns for three reasons: (1) The direct effect 
of systematic risk exposure; (2) An indirect effect if distressed obligors cut back on 
asset/collateral maintenance and control; and (3) An indirect effect if distressed lenders 
dump assets/collateral in fire sale liquidations.36   
INSERT TABLE 10 AROUND HERE 
Frye (2000a) models collateral values as a function of both idiosyncratic and 
systematic risk factors, finding a considerable impact of cyclical factors on expected 
losses.  Frye (2000b) estimates that the correlation between asset values and the 
systematic risk factor (for a US bond database over the period 1983-1997) is 23% and 
that the correlation between collateral values and the systematic risk factor is almost the 
                                                 
36 Pulvino (1998) finds evidence of asset fire sales in the commercial aircraft market. 
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same: 17%.37   To illustrate the impact of cyclical factors on both PD and LGD, consider 
that the unconditional expected loss (EL) is defined to be PD x LGD.  Using an example 
from Frye (2000a), suppose that PD=5% and expected LGD=10%; then the unconditional 
EL is 0.5%.  If only the PD is conditioned on an economic downturn, such that 
PD=45.4% in a recession, then the EL increases to 4.5%.  However, if both the PD and 
LGD are conditioned on the economic downturn such that conditional LGD=26.1% [from 
Frye (2000a)], then the conditional EL = 45.4% x 26.1% = 11.8% shows a considerable 
increase over the unconditional EL. 
Jokivuolle and Peura (2000) model the recovery rate as a function of the PD and 
show that the expected LGD is a decreasing function of the growth rate in the value of 
collateral, an increasing function of the volatility of the collateral value, and an increasing 
function of the correlation between the collateral value and the value of the borrower 
firm’s total assets. Moreover, the expected LGD is a decreasing function of the default 
probability of the borrower, given that the correlation between the collateral and the firm 
values is positive.  This counterintuitive result obtains because of the use of an options 
theoretic structural model to depict default.  That is, low PD firms must experience 
abnormally large negative shocks to asset values to enter the default region and therefore 
the value of their collateral is quite impaired.  In contrast, high PD firms (with a low 
distance-to-default) are thrown into default by only slight declines in asset values.  Thus, 
the recovery rates of low credit quality firms tend to be higher than recovery rates in high 
credit quality firms in the Jokivuolle and Peura (2000) simulations. 
                                                 
37 Frye (2000b) also estimates that the standard deviation of collateral values is 32%, suggesting that 
collateral values are very volatile.  Conditional on a realization of the systematic risk factor, PD and LGD 
are assumed to be independent.  Thus, for a given state of the economy, the conditional EL equals product 
of the conditional PD and the conditional LGD. 
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Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) consider endogenous recovery rates that are a 
fixed fraction of asset values.  The impact of endogenous LGD is to increase default 
correlations as compared to the exogenous case.38   Moreover, the relationship between 
PD levels and default correlations is exacerbated when LGD is endogenously determined 
by asset values.  However, this result assumes that the cyclical effect is constant over 
time.  If instead there are regime shifts that affect the firm’s exposure to systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk factors, then the default correlation function will shift over time.  
Indeed, extreme outcomes (i.e., boom or bust) may result in greater default correlations 
because information is revealed about the underlying regime state.  Thus, if PD and LGD 
both increase in economic downturns and decrease in economic upturns, then the cyclical 
effect (as measured by both default correlations and LGD correlations) will be more 
pronounced. 
4.1.2 Reduced Form Models of Cyclical Effects on LGD 
Reduced form models estimate the default intensity function using observed credit 
spreads on risky debt.  The credit spread is defined as PD x LGD.  Thus, reduced form 
models must find some way to disentangle the PD from the LGD in each observation of 
the credit spread.  Many of the earlier reduced form models focused on modeling the 
default intensity, PD, in order to disentangle these two components of the credit spread.  
Their simplifying assumptions that the LGD was either constant or proportion to bond 
value were counterfactual. As we have seen, observed recovery rates are volatile and 
appear to have a cyclical component.  Moreover, the default intensity also fluctuates with 
the business cycle and systemic risk conditions.   
                                                 
38 This is true whatever the sign of the correlation coefficient because loan repayments provide full 
information about realized returns when recovery rates are endogenous, thereby increasing default 
correlations as compared to the exogenous LGD case. 
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Das and Tufano (1995) allow a proportional LGD to vary over time, but maintain 
the assumption of independence between LGD and PD.  Duffie and Singleton (1999) 
allow for (economic) state-dependence of both LGD and PD, as well as interdependence 
between LGD and PD; however, they assume independence between firm asset value and 
the LGD and PD processes, an assumption that does not hold if, for example, the debt 
obligation is a large part of the issuer’s capital structure.   
The pure recovery model of Unal, Madan and Guntay (2001) decomposes the 
difference between the price of senior versus junior debt in order to obtain a measure of 
recovery rates on senior debt relative to junior debt that is independent of default 
probabilities.  The recovery rate is conditioned on the business cycle (measured using 
macroeconomic factors) and firm specific information.   Table 11 shows that the 
estimated mean recovery rates (1-LGD) for the 11 companies in the sample39 are 
extremely volatile both across time and cross-sectionally, thereby casting doubt on the 
assumption of a constant LGD rate.   
INSERT TABLE 11 AROUND HERE 
4.2 Proprietary Models 
Most proprietary models have not incorporated cyclical effects into their 
modeling of LGD.  Many proprietary models (KMV, CreditMetrics, Credit Risk Plus) 
make simple distributional assumptions (e.g., the beta distribution) about LGD values 
that do not contain a systematic risk component.  An exception to this is Kamakura Risk 
Manager.  Kamakura uses equity prices to obtain a liquidation value that can be viewed 
                                                 
39 There would not have been enough observations for the Unal, Madan and Guntay (2001) study if the 
sample were limited to zero coupon, non-callable debt as is usually done in reduced form models; 
therefore, junior and senior debt issues were matched by choosing the closest possible duration and coupon 
rates.  There were only 11 companies with enough data to fully estimate the model. 
 36 
as the LGD.  That is, the market value of equity can be viewed as a lower bound on LGD 
in the sense that recovery rates on debt must at least equal the market value of equity.   
The recovery rate is calculated as one minus the market value of equity to assets ratio 
(i.e., the debt ratio in market value terms) times the face value of the debt.  The seniority 
order in priority of claims on the firm’s assets seems to suggest that if the market value of 
equity exceeds zero, then all creditors are expected to receive full payment on their 
claims; thereby, implying that LGD=0.  However, in more than 75% of the cases of 
bankrupt firms, reorganization entails deviations from absolute priority.  Because of US 
bankruptcy laws which assign voting power to blocks of claimants on a pro rata basis, 
even junior claimants (such as common stockholders) may have the power to block a 
reorganization plan and thereby demand a share of the payout, even if senior claimants 
are not paid in full.  Thus, the market value of equity can be viewed as a lower bound on 
the payout to senior claimants such as debtholders.   Since equity prices fluctuate with 
cyclical conditions, the Kamakura estimate of LGD is therefore cyclically adjusted.   
 
5 The Correlation Between PD and LGD 
We have seen that many models of credit risk measurement incorporate cyclical 
factors into their estimation of PD, but not LGD.  The sophistication of modeling 
deteriorates even further when considering feedback effects between PD and LGD.  That 
is, evidence suggests the existence of cyclical components in both PD and LGD.  If both 
PD and LGD are correlated to the same systematic risk factors, then they should be 
correlated with each other.  This section surveys academic studies that consider the joint 
cyclicality of PD and LGD.  There is no section on proprietary models because there are 
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no models that we are aware of that explicitly consider the correlation between PD and 
LGD. 
5.1 Academic Models 
In Frye’s (2000a,b) structural model, collateral and asset values are modeled 
using a single index based on a systematic and an idiosyncratic risk factor.  Correlations 
between PD and LGD then are obtained by the joint factor loadings on the systematic risk 
factor for both the asset and collateral valuation functions.  Thus, correlations between 
PD and LGD result from the joint dependence of collateral and asset values on systematic 
risk factors.  It is therefore not surprising that the correlation coefficients for both asset 
and collateral values with the systematic risk factor are estimated to be almost identical: 
23% vs. 17%.  Conceptually, therefore, the correlation between PD and LGD emanates 
from the assumption that recovery rates are determined by the valuation of all assets, 
including the loan’s collateral.  Thus, the collateral valuation function is based on the 
single index asset valuation function.40 
Altman , Resti and Sironi (2002) exhaustively investigate the correlation between 
both ex post realized and simulated default rates and recovery rates. Using a US 
corporate bond database covering the period 1982-2000, they empirically estimate the 
relationship between PD and recovery rates.  They find strong evidence of an inverse 
relationship such that recovery rates fall (rise) when PD increases (decreases).  The 
explanation for this result stems from supply and demand considerations in the market for 
distressed debt.  When default rates increase, for instance in cyclical downturns, there is 
likely to be more defaulted bonds available for sale on the distressed debt market.  The 
                                                 
40 Frye’a (2000a) model ignores a possible relationship between the asset idiosyncratic risk factor and 
collateral values or between the collateral idiosyncratic risk factor and asset values. 
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demand for such below investment grade instruments is relatively inelastic since buyers 
are restricted to “vulture” funds and the few financial intermediaries that are permitted 
invest in this paper.41  Thus, since supply increases during cyclical downturns whereas 
demand is relatively stable, the price of distressed debt declines, thereby reducing 
recovery values when defaults increase.  Using parameter values consistent with the size 
of the market in 2001, Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002) estimate that recovery rates are 
20% assuming an 8.5% default rate as compared to a recovery rate of 18% assuming a 
10% default rate.42   However, explicitly controlling for macroeconomic effects (using 
variables like GDP and changes in GDP) yields insignificant and inconsistent results in 
the Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002) model. 
Despite the plausibility of an inverse relationship between PD and recovery rates, 
the question may be posed as to its empirical significance.  For example, is the above-
mentioned decrease in recovery rate from 20% to 18% economically significant?  
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002) demonstrate the important implications of correlated PD 
and LGD in two ways: (1) Simulating three different recovery rate scenarios (only one of 
which assumes correlated PD and LGD) and examining the impact on credit risk 
measures; and (2) Simulating the impact of cyclical fluctuations on capital requirements 
as proposed under the New Basel Capital Accord’s Internal Ratings-Based Foundations 
Approach.  Both show the considerable impact of correlated PD and LGD. 
                                                 
41 Altman (1991) attempted to measure the size of demand in this market for “alternative investments” and 
estimated that the vulture funds had at least $7 billion under management in 1991.  In contrast, the supply 
of distressed and defaulted public and private bonds (selling at a credit spread at least 1000 basis points 
over 10 year Treasury bond rates) was approximately $300 billion during the 1990-1991 period.  Given the 
ten to one disparity in size between the supply and demand sides of the market, Altman, Resti and Sironi. 
(2002) contend that even  dramatic increases in demand would not be sufficient to absorb the increased 
supply during cyclical downturns. 
42 The actual recovery rate in 2001 was 25.5% and the default rate in 2001 was 9.8%; see Altman and 
Arman (2002). 
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The first simulation analysis performed by Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002) 
considers deterministic recovery rates (as in the basic model of Credit Risk Plus), 
stochastic yet uncorrelated LGD (as in CreditMetrics), and stochastic and correlated 
LGD.43 They find no significant differences in the VaR under the first two scenarios.  
However, Table 12 shows that consideration of correlated LGDs increase the estimates of 
VaR by as much as 30%.   
INSERT TABLE 12 AROUND HERE 
 To test the implications of correlated PD and LGD on bank capital requirements, 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002) compare the January 2001 proposals to the November 
2001 proposals for the Internal Ratings-Based Foundation Approach.  Two possible LGD 
scenarios are used: (1) a fixed 50% LGD; and (2) LGDs fluctuate between 60% in high 
default years and 40% in low default years.  They find evidence of procyclical 
fluctuations in minimum capital requirements such that loan portfolios can grow during 
economic upturns and are forced to shrink during downturns.  Moreover, consideration of 
correlated PD and LGD exacerbates these procyclical swings.44 
 
 
6 Cyclical Effects on Exposure At Default (EAD) 
Credit risk measures depend on PD, LGD and exposure at default (EAD).  Both 
regulatory and proprietary models typically define EAD to be the book value of assets 
less any netting due to credit risk mitigation factors.  Similarly, academic models take 
                                                 
43 Under their specification, LGDs increase up to 50% in economic downturns and go down to 10% in 
economic boom periods.  That is, Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002) use a single index model in which the 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors each receive a 50% weight.  In contrast, the January 2001 Basel 
proposal assumes a 33-67% systematic-idiosyncratic weighting scheme. 
44 Interestingly, the procyclical tendencies are the same in both the January 2001 and November 2001 
calibrations of the Basel capital proposals.  This is because the November 2001 risk weighting function is 
steeper than the January 2001 risk weight function in the interior “normal” credit quality classifications, 
although the Janaury 2001 risk weight function is more convex over all default specifications. 
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exposures as given.  However, there is anecdotal evidence of procyclicality in EAD, 
particularly for loan commitments.  That is, the likelihood of commitment takedown and 
the extent of commitment usage increases during economic downturns when credit is 
tight and credit-constrained firms are experiencing liquidity crises.  Table 13 reproduces 
the results of Asarnow and Marker (1995) showing the significant increase in takedown 
rates upon default.  This effect is particularly strong for firms that had better credit ratings 
prior to default.  Thus, if default is more sudden (and perhaps more likely to be triggered 
by downturns in macroeconomic activity), then the increase in the lender’s EAD (through 
increased loan exposure as a result of increased commitment takedown) is more 
pronounced.  More marginal firms are less likely to be permitted to take down large 
percentages of their loan commitments after default, perhaps because of the lender’s 
invocation of the material adverse change clause that permits the lender to alter the terms 
of the commitment ex post.  Thus, the procyclicality in EAD appears to be introduced 
mostly through high credit quality obligations. 
INSERT TABLE 13 AROUND HERE 
6.1 Structural Models of Cyclical Effects on EAD 
Academic models have only peripherally investigated procyclicality in EAD.  
Mueller (2000) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) model leverage levels as a 
function of macroeconomic factors.  That is, the level of indebtedness may increase at the 
low point of the business cycle, as in the anecdotal example that loan commitments are 
increasingly taken down by credit constrained firms. The procyclicality in leverage levels 
leads to increased EAD just at the time that PD increases.  This procyclical effect 
exacerbates credit risk exposure.  Moreover, Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) use 
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economy-wide measures of asset volatility and profitability in order to compute a cyclical 
leverage ratio that results in increases (decreases) in EAD during macroeconomic 
downturns (upturns).  Incorporating this cyclically adjusted leverage ratio improves the 
quality of model estimates of PD as compared to the Merton (1974) model.  
Credit supply and demand is further linked by Hofmann (2001) by including 
property prices in a cointegration analysis.  He finds that real GDP and real interest rates 
are not sufficient to explain the long run development of credit availability.  However, 
including real property prices (measured as the weighted average of real residential and 
real commercial property prices) results in a model that links credit availability to GDP, 
property prices and interest rates.  This model is procyclical and can generate financial 
bubbles based on inflated property prices.  That is, increases in property prices increase 
lending and vice versa.  Therefore, inflationary booms and deflationary busts are self-
sustaining.   
Saunders and Mei (1997) also find evidence of cyclicality in the supply of real 
estate loans. However, their findings can be interpreted as evidence of counter-
cyclicality.  They find that past trends in real estate returns drive the supply of credit for 
real estate purchases, such that lending increases (decreases) when past excess returns on 
real estate increases (decreases), although future expected returns are decreasing 
(increasing).  This “trend chasing” behavior may actually insulate banks against 
procyclicality in EAD if property prices fall before recessions.  That is, banks reduce 
(increase) their real estate lending exposure prior to the recession (expansion) because of 
the trend chasing cyclicality in lending that alternates between booms and slumps in real 
estate credit availability.  However, if real estate price fluctuations lag macroeconomic 
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fluctuations, then bank trend chasing behavior would instead exacerbate the 
procyclicality of EAD.  Borio and Lowe (2002) propose the development of a signal of 
speculative excess that would be comprised of the credit/GDP gap, the real asset price 
gap, and the investment/GDP gap.  If used to guide monetary and prudential policy, they 
contend that this early warning system could prevent the boom/bust cycles in credit 
markets.45    
The relationship between lending activity and macroeconomic conditions is also 
modeled by Lown and Morgan (2001) who find that bank lending standards display 
counter cyclical tendencies as evidenced in a credit cycle.  Lown and Morgan (2001) 
show that fluctuations in commercial credit standards at banks lead to fluctuations in both 
the Fed Funds rate and in the level of commercial lending activity, which in turn lead to 
fluctuations in credit quality.  Using Federal Reserve surveys, they find that all recessions 
since 1967 have been preceded by an increase in the percentage of loan officers reporting 
tightening credit standards for commercial and industrial loans or credit lines.    
Moreover, changes in the business failure rate account for about 10% of the change in 
credit standards.  Thus, bank EADs may decline as lending standards are tightened before 
cyclical downturns, thereby providing a counter cyclical impact on bank credit risk 
exposure.  Of course, Lown and Morgan’s (2001) results apply only to the US.  It is 
unclear whether the counter cyclical effects are generalizable to other countries.  In 
particular, this effect might be more relevant in bank-dominated systems.  However, it 
may not be applicable in countries such as Japan in which the banking system has been 
unable to efficiently perform the capital allocation process. 
                                                 
45 This suggests that central banks may set monetary policy by following property price fluctuations.  
Goodhart (1995) suggests that financial cycles of the late 1980s and early 1990s could have been avoided if 
central banks had targeted property prices in the conduct of their monetary policies. 
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Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) and Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001) also model 
potential counter cyclical effects.  They argue that if loan loss reserves are set to equal 
expected losses, in a forward-looking predictive manner, rather than equal to ex post 
realized losses, then the procyclical tendencies of banking can be mitigated somewhat.  
That is, as economic conditions are forecast to deteriorate, the bank would be required to 
reserve higher levels against the higher loan losses expected to occur because of the 
cyclical sensitivity of both PD and LGD, thereby reducing lending activity (EAD) at 
capital constrained banks in preparation for a cyclical downturn. 
6.2 Reduced Form Models of Cyclical Effects on EAD 
Chang and Sundaresan (1999) examine an equilibrium model of asset pricing in 
which asset prices, the default risk-free term structure and the default premiums are all 
determined endogenously.  Borrowers optimally default when the cost of default 
(forfeiture of assets) is lower than the savings from repudiated debt service.  As economic 
conditions deteriorate (and the value of assets falls), the PD increases, causing investors 
to become more risk averse.  This leads to the “flight to quality” observed in the low 
point of the business cycle.   Since cyclical variations lead to fluctuations in the default 
risk-free rate of interest in the Chang and Sundaresan (1999) model, then changes in PD 
are inversely related to changes in default risk-free interest rates.  That is, as PD 
increases, investors seek default risk-free investments, thereby bidding down the yield 
and increasing EAD.  Thus, as the value of assets declines (in a cyclical downturn), the 
default premium increases, default risk-free interest rates decline and the default risk-free 
term structure becomes steeper.  The endogenous correlation structure between PD and 
 44 
default risk-free interest rates is driven, in part, by fluctuations in EAD caused by the 
procyclical flight to quality. 
The results of Chang and Sundaresan (1999) are consistent with several reduced 
form models that incorporate the correlation between default risk-free interest rates and 
default risk.   Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) utilize a two factor model that specifies a 
negative relationship between the stochastic processes determining credit spreads and 
default-free interest rates.   Duffee (1998) finds that changes in credit spreads are 
negatively related to changes in risk-free interest rates for lower credit quality bonds.   
However, using a structural model, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) find 
little correlation between macroeconomic variables and changes in credit spreads.  That 
is, they find evidence of a common factor driving credit spreads, but cannot relate that 
common factor to any of the standard macroeconomic variables that are used to measure 
liquidity, changes in the business climate, changes in market volatility, changes in the 
level of interest rates and the slope of the yield curve, leverage changes and other firm-
specific variables.  Thus, they find evidence of the significant cross-correlations across 
credit spread changes that would be consistent with procyclicality, but cannot find any 
direct evidence of macroeconomic and systemic risk effects.  Although they use two 
separate databases on US bond prices, they conclude that their results may be due to 
market imperfections (such as transaction costs and illiquidity) in the US bond market 
that may inject noise into bond prices.  However, they call for more research examining 
the interaction between market risk and credit risk as a possible explanation for this 
mysterious common factor affecting credit spreads. 
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6.3 Integrating Credit Risk and Market Risk 
The integration of credit risk and other components of risk exposure, such as 
interest rate risk and market risk, is still in its infancy.  However, ignoring the 
correlations between interest rate risk and credit risk may result in faulty estimates of 
both risk exposures.  Barnhill and Gleason (2001) consider the correlation of credit and 
interest rate risk.  They show that correlations across risk exposures can cause an increase 
in failure probability for a bank with a positive duration gap.  That is, increases in credit 
risk exposure are accompanied by increases in interest rate risk exposure.  Bhansali and 
Wise (2001) forecast future correlation matrices using underlying risk factors such as 
interest rate risk (duration), a mortgage spread risk factor and a corporate spread risk 
factor.  They show that the loan portfolio’s duration can be shortened by almost 50% as a 
result of the increased credit risk associated with shifting from a normal to a stressed 
economic scenario.  Moreover, Bhansali and Wise (2001) show that crisis economic 
conditions may cause risk factors to move beyond their historical levels, thereby 
underscoring the importance of using forecast measures of correlations in credit risk 
estimates, rather than simply taking historical averages.  In contrast, however, Allen, 
Jagtiani and Landskroner (1996) find a negative correlation between credit risk exposure 
(as measured in BIS I) and interest rate risk exposure for banks engaged in regulatory 
capital arbitrage. 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we survey the literature on cyclical effects on PD, LGD and EAD.  
Although systematic risk factors have been incorporated into both academic and 
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proprietary models of PD, the same is not true for LGD and EAD.  Moreover, systematic 
correlation effects between PD and LGD, PD and EAD, and LGD and EAD have been 
virtually ignored in the literature.  Clearly, a great deal of work needs to be done in these 
areas before regulators will be convinced that bank internal models can accurately 
measure credit risk exposures, especially in recessions. 
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Table 1 
The Relationship Between PD  
and Macroeconomic Conditions 
Source: Altman (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Default Rate Default Loss 
3 Q 2001 6.92 % 5.29 % 
2000 5.06 3.94 
1999 4.15 3.21 
1998 1.60 1.10 
1997 1.25 0.65 
1996 1.23 0.65 
1995 1.90 1.24 
1994 1.45 0.96 
1993 1.11 0.56 
1992 3.40 1.91 
1991 10.27 7.16 
1990 10.14 8.42 
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Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systematic Risk (Beta) by Bond Rating Category 
Barnhill and Maxwell (1999) – Table VI 
 
Rating Category Mean Beta (1993-1998) 
for Low Volatility Firms 
Mean Beta (1993-1998) 
for High Volatility Firms 
Aaa 0.679 0.682 
Aa 0.649 0.757 
A 0.699 0.864 
Baa 0.864 0.994 
Ba 1.019 1.131 
B 1.314 1.314 
Caa 1.301 1.301 
Note: Low (high) volatility firms were defined to be those in the lower third 
(remaining two thirds) of total equity return volatility. 
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Table 3 
Default Correlations and Increasing PD 
Gersbach and Lipponer (2000) – Table 1 
 
Default Probability Default Correlation if 
Asset Correlation = 40% 
Default Correlation if 
Asset Correlation = 80% 
1 % 0.08 0.37 
5 % 0.14 0.47 
10 % 0.18 0.51 
15 % 0.21 0.54 
20 % 0.22 0.56 
25 % 0.24 0.57 
30 % 0.25 0.58 
35 % 0.25 0.58 
40 % 0.26 0.58 
45 % 0.26 0.59 
50 % 0.26 0.59 
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Table 4 
Term Structure in Default Correlations 
Zhou (2001), Table 8 
 
Investment Time Horizon  Credit 
Quality 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 10 years 
High grade 0.0 % 0.02 % 0.23 % 0.80 % 1.72 % 7.93 % 
Low grade 4.29 % 12.2 % 16.8 % 19.5 % 21.1 % 24.0 % 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Correlations Across Risk Factors 
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2001) Table 2 
 
 Correlations 
Austria 
For 
Belgium 
Country 
Italy 
Factors: 
Netherlands 
Global 
Factor 
Loadings 
Country 
Factor 
Loadings 
Austria     0.371 0.272 
Belgium -0.83    0.462 0.181 
Italy -0.04 0.04   0.434 0.198 
Netherlands 0.68 -0.77 -0.10  0.305 0.168 
Spain -0.80 0.78 0.32 -0.78 0.488 0.253 
 
Notes:  Factor loadings are average squared loadings with the respective risk factor.  All 
other are correlations.  The correlation between the global factor and each of the country 
factors is zero by construction.
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Table 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Simulated Systematic Risk Premiums 
Belkin, Suchower and Forest (1998) Table 3 
 
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
4.6 bp 8.5 bp 17.5 bp 35.9 bp 181.5 bp 317.5 bp 839.0 bp 
 
Notes:  The systematic risk premium is estimated for the par spreads on a simulated loan 
portfolio of 10,000 loans with the same external credit rating and with an assumed 
pairwise correlation coefficient of 25%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations under Time-Varying Default Probabilities 
Das, Freed, Geng, Kapadia (2001) – Table 5 
 
Group 1/87 – 4/90 
Time Period 
5/90 – 12/93 
Time Period 
1/94 – 4/97 
Time Period 
5/97 – 10/00 
Time Period 
High Credit 
Quality 
0.34 
[0.37] 
0.11 
[0.10] 
0.03 
[0.01] 
0.13 
[0.11] 
Medium Credit 
Quality 
0.25 
[0.23] 
0.13 
[0.10] 
0.04 
[0.02] 
0.10 
[0.08] 
Low Credit 
Quality 
0.19 
[0.16] 
0.09 
[0.07] 
0.03 
[0.02] 
0.10 
[0.08] 
Notes: The subperiods were endogenously determined using a 
switching of regression regimes model.  The means [median] of 
pairwise correlations between firms belonging to each group are 
presented in the table. 
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Table 8 
Conditional Transition Matrices - CreditPortfolio View 
Saunders and Allen (2002) Appendix 7.1 
 
Unconditional Transition Matrix: 
  A  B  C  D 
C        .01  .04  .80  .15 
 
Conditional Transition Matrix: 
A  B  C  D 
C        .0124  .034  .7796  .174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
The Relationship Between Recovery Rates 
and Macroeconomic Conditions 
Altman with Brady (2001) 
Year Senior Secured Senior Unsec. Subordinated All Securities 
3Q2001 40.95 % 33.19 % 0 % 28.02% 
2000 39.58 25.40 26.62 25.83 
1999 26.90 42.54 13.88 31.14 
1998 70.38 39.57 0 37.27 
1997 74.90 70.94 60.00 53.89 
1996 59.08 50.11 44.23 51.91 
1995 44.64 50.50 20.00 41.77 
1994 48.66 51.14 37.04 39.44 
1993 55.75 33.38 28.38 38.83 
1992 59.85 35.61 49.13 50.03 
1991 44.12 55.84 24.30 40.67 
1990 32.18 29.02 18.83 24.66 
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Table 10 
Frye (2000b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paramter Values (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Standard deviation 
of recovery rate 
 
0.32 
 
0.32 
 
0.32 
 
0.25 
 
0.25 
PD 1.99% 2.00% 0.20% 2.00% 0.20% 
Expected LGD  
59.1% 
 
30.7% 
 
30.7% 
 
30.7% 
 
30.7% 
Normal state PD  
1.8% 
 
1.7% 
 
0.2% 
 
1.7% 
 
0.2% 
Normal state LGD  
55% 
 
28% 
 
27% 
 
28% 
 
28% 
Depressed state PD  
10.4% 
 
14.8% 
 
2.9% 
 
14.8% 
 
2.9% 
Depressed state 
LGD 
 
80% 
 
52% 
 
51% 
 
47% 
 
47% 
Normal state 
Expected Loss 
 
0.99% 
 
 
0.48% 
 
0.05% 
 
0.48% 
 
0.06% 
Distressed state 
Expected Loss 
 
8.32% 
 
7.70% 
 
1.48% 
 
6.96% 
 
1.36% 
Note: For all model specifications, the systematic risk beta for assets (collateral) is 0.23 
(0.17). 
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Table 11 
Unal, Madan and Guntay (2001) 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 
Estimating Recovery Rates (1-LGD) Using a 
Reduced Form Model 
 
Company Estimated 
Mean 
Recovery 
Rate 
Volatility of 
Recovery 
Rate 
σ 
Industry 
Average 
 
Root Mean 
Squared 
Error 
AMC 52.2 2.969 37.1 0.042 
American Medical 12.5 0.500 26.5 0.037 
Coastal Corp. 63.3 0.010 70.5 0.100 
Envirotest Systems 34.3 0.118 46.2 0.075 
Flagstar 12.7 0.713 33.2 0.045 
Revlon 40.5 0.447 62.7 0.083 
Sequa Corp. 59.2 0.081 38.4 0.073 
Stone Container 9.6 0.113 29.8 0.082 
Sweetheart Cup 56.7 0.124 62.7 0.064 
Valassis Insterts 19.1 0.010 46.2 0.086 
Del Webb Corp. 39.3 1.163 35.3 0.026 
Source: Unal, et. al. (2001).  Industry averages are obtained from 
Altman and Kishore (1996). 
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Table 12 
Simulations of LGD Scenarios on Credit Risk Measures 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2002), Table 2 
 
 Deterministic 
LGD 
 
 
(1) 
Stochastic, but 
uncorrelated 
LGD 
 
(2) 
Stochastic 
LGD partially 
correlated 
with PD 
(3) 
Comparison 
Betw. Col. (1) 
and Col. (3) 
(3) – (1) 
(1) 
Expected Loss 463 458 598 29.4 % 
Standard Error 982 978 1,272 29.5 % 
95% VaR 1,899 1,880 2,449 28.9 % 
99% VaR 3,835 3,851 4,972 29.6 % 
99.5% VaR 3,591 3,579 4,653 29.6 % 
99.9% VaR 3,738 3,774 4,887 30.7 % 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Average Usage of Commitments to Lend 
Asarnow and Marker (1995) 
 
Credit Rating 
Prior to Default 
Average Commitment 
Usage 
Usage of normally unused 
commitment in the event 
of default 
AAA 0.1 % 69 % 
AA 1.6 % 73 % 
A 4.6 % 71 % 
BBB 20.0 % 65 % 
BB 46.8 % 52 % 
B 63.7 % 48 % 
CCC 75.0 % 44 % 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3, Panel A 
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Figure 3, Panel B 
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Figure 4 
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